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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Yugoslavia

REPORT

SUBJECT [] the
Djilas Case

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BY CABLE

1. Djilas had for sometime been "lost in the clouds", as often happens to theoreticians. His colleagues had tried to rescue him and bring him back down to earth by interesting him in everyday practical official tasks and functions. Djilas was appointed to the post of President of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly for this very reason, but to no avail. 25X1
2. Prior to the publication of his ideological articles, Djilas expounded his views to Aleksandar Rankovic and Edvard Kardelj, both Vice Presidents of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council. When these two officials disagreed with his opinions, Djilas called them opportunists.¹
3. Yugoslav officials considered some of Djilas' views reasonable, others inadvisable, and the rest just impossible of implementation in Yugoslavia at the present time. Generally Djilas' articles were the ramblings of a confused man, and Djilas got what he deserved when he was relieved of his party posts in the Federation of Yugoslav Communists (FYC).

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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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4. Djilas' unilateral appeal to the Yugoslav public rather than to the Central Committee (CC) of the FYC was at variance with the discipline expected of a person in his leading position. If Djilas had any recommendations to make relative to changes in Party ideology, he should have prepared a pamphlet or book and presented it to the CC for review and debate.
5. The fact that Djilas' articles were published demonstrates that there is no press censorship in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav leaders were surprised that until January 1954, the foreign press failed to pay any attention to Djilas' articles, which were obviously peculiar and strange.
6. It is best for both the West and Yugoslavia that Djilas has been exposed for his challenge which is tantamount to a repudiation of President Tito, who personally holds together the entire Yugoslav nation. Any threat to Tito and his authority is a threat to the security of Yugoslavia and to the West, which is a friend of Yugoslavia. Purges of recalcitrants in Yugoslavia, though few, are necessary to safeguard the security of the nation.
7. The views of Vladimir Dedijer, who defended Djilas, are childish and reflect his immaturity. Dedijer wept when the CC of the FYC took action to oust Djilas, since he undoubtedly feared this signified the end and possibly death for both him and Djilas. Dedijer should have realized that unlike the Soviets, the Yugoslavs can afford to assume a tolerant attitude and impose a milder form of disciplinary action in such a serious case as that of Djilas. Djilas will be salvaged and be given some small job such as head of a secondary school or of some small enterprise, in order that he may earn a living.

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